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Abstract—The capacity of symmetric private information re-
trieval with K messages, N servers (out of which any T
may collude), and an omniscient Byzantine adversary (who can
corrupt any B answers) is shown to be 1− T+2B
N
[1], under the
requirement of zero probability of error. In this work, we show
that by weakening the adversary slightly (either providing secret
low rate channels between the servers and the user, or limiting the
observation of the adversary), and allowing vanishing probability
of error, the capacity increases to 1− T+B
N
.
I. INTRODUCTION
We are interested in the problem of symmetric private
information retrieval (PIR) with Byzantine adversaries. In
symmetric PIR (SPIR), there are K messages, stored over
N replicated servers, and a user that wishes to retrieve 1
out of the K messages without revealing the desired message
index to any T servers. The user fulfills this PIR task by first
sending queries to the servers and then receiving 1 answer
from each server. From the N answers, the user decodes the
desired message either with exactly zero probability of error
or with vanishing probability of error (when the message size
approaches infinity). The servers do not allow the user to learn
any information beyond the desired message (so that the pri-
vacy of the dataset is symmetrically protected). The efficiency
of an SPIR protocol is measured by the capacity, C, defined as
the maximum amount of information retrieved over the total
download from the servers (the answer sizes). We consider
the presence of Byzantine adversaries in this work. Byzantine
adversaries might observe a certain number of communication
links (answers) between the servers and the user and modify
any B answers. We focus on the interplay between the capa-
bility of the adversary (omniscient or limited knowledge) and
the error criterion (zero-error or ǫ-error). Among all possible
models, the strongest (most restricted) requirement is that the
adversary is omniscient (i.e., the adversary has full knowledge
and observes all communication between the servers and the
user) and the decoding at the user’s side must have exactly zero
error1. We call this problem 0-BfTSPIR, where the letter f
represents full knowledge. The weakest requirement is that the
1Note that if we insist on zero error, then it does not matter whether the
adversary has full or limited knowledge. The reason is that the adversary
may assume an arbitrary realization of the knowledge that he is missing and
the probability of guessing the missing knowledge correctly is non-zero. The
zero-error decoding constraint requires that decoding error can never occur
(including the case when the adversary guesses the full knowledge correctly
so that full knowledge case is covered).
adversary has limited knowledge and the decoding at the user’s
side is allowed to have vanishingly small probability of error.
We call this problem ǫ-BlTSPIR, where the letter l represents
limited knowledge. This work is motivated by the following
question - when we relax the problem from 0-BfTSPIR to
ǫ-BlTSPIR, is it possible to increase the capacity of PIR,
because of the presence of a less omnipotent adversary and
the requirement of a less stringent decoding criterion?
Before stating our result, we first briefly summarize prior
works on capacity results of SPIR and its related variants.
The capacity of SPIR with no colluding servers (T = 1) is
characterized in [2],
CSPIR =
N − 1
N
= 1−
1
N
.
The intuition is that out of the N answers, 1 answer is
useless because it provides no useful information of the desired
message. Then we only have N − 1 effective answers and
the ratio (rate) is thus (N − 1)/N . To see why 1 answer is
independent of the desired message, note that the user can not
learn anything about undesired messages (data-privacy con-
straint) so that any 1 answer can not contain any information
about undesired messages. Further, because any 1 server does
not learn anything about the desired message index (user-
privacy constraint), any server can not distinguish desired and
undesired messages so that the server’s answer can not contain
any information about any message (including the desired
one). The generalization of user-privacy from any individual
server to any T colluding servers is considered in [3] and the
capacity is characterized as
CTSPIR =
N − T
N
= 1−
T
N
.
This result could be interpreted intuitively in a similar manner,
where any T answers are of no use due to the combination
of the T -private user-privacy constraint and the data-privacy
constraint. The above two capacity results hold under both
zero-error and ǫ-error criteria. The presence of a full knowl-
edge Byzantine adversary with zero-error decoding constraint
(the 0-BfTSPIR problem) is considered in [1], and its capacity
is characterized as
C0-BfTSPIR =
N − T −B −B
N
= 1−
T + 2B
N
.
Compared with the capacity of TSPIR, the capacity expression
has an additional term of 2B (another 2B wasted answers),
which could be interpreted as follows. As the Byzantine
adversary may modify any B answers, the corrupted answers
might have zero information of the desired message so that
these B answers can not contribute anything to the decoding
(akin to B erasures). It turns out that we have to pay a price
of another B answers to identify and correct the B erroneous
answers (in total, 2B answers). The focus of this work is on the
ǫ-BlTSPIR problem where the adversary is partially blind and
the decoding is allowed to be erroneous occasionally, and we
ask if any saving on the 2B wasted answers for the Byzantine
adversary is possible.
Our main contribution is summarized next. The main result
of this work is the capacity characterization of the ǫ-BlTSPIR
problem. We show that
Cǫ-BlTSPIR =
N − T −B
N
= 1−
T +B
N
under two models of Byzantine adversaries with limited
knowledge.2
1) There exist secret channels (with vanishing rate) be-
tween the servers and the user that are not observed
by the adversary.
2) There exists at least 1 answer that the adversary is not
able to observe or corrupt (i.e., the total number of
answers observed or corrupted is smaller than N ).
The interpretation of this capacity result is that as long as we
may hide some information to the adversary (we have shown
two examples, one with secret channels and one with limited
observations) and ǫ-error is allowed, then we can avoid the
loss of the B answers that are used to correct the B erroneous
answers and the problem with B errors reduces to the problem
with B erasures. This is made possible through the hidden
information and the allowance of small probability of decoding
error. To answer the question that motivates our work, it is
not only possible to increase the capacity by weakening the
adversary and decoding requirement, but also the price to pay
is minimal, i.e., reducing a small amount of knowledge to the
omniscient adversary and relaxing zero-error to ǫ-error.
Notation: For variables X,Y , [X Y ] and [X ;Y ] denote
a row vector and a column vector respectively. For integers
n1 ≤ n2, [n1 : n2] denotes the set {n1, n1+1, · · · , n2}. For a
vector I = (i1, i2, · · · , in), AI represents the column vector
[Ai1 ;Ai2 ; · · · ;Ain ]. Denote the N ×M Vandermonde matrix
generated from N distinct symbols λ1, λ2, . . . , λN from a finite
field by VM (λ1, . . . , λN ), where the (i.j)-th element is λ
j−1
i .
II. PROBLEM SETUP
A dataset comprised of K messages is stored over N
replicated servers. The messages {Wk} are independent and
each message consists of L i.i.d. symbols from Fq, i.e.,
H(Wk) = L, ∀k ∈ [1 : K] and H(W1, . . . ,WK) = KL.
Here and throughout the paper we measure entropy to base q.
A user wants to retrieve a message Wκ from the servers,
where the desired message index κ is drawn from some prior
2The two adversary models have been studied in the network coding
literature [4], [5].
distribution over [1 : K]. Denote the realization of κ by k.
Based on k, the user generates random queries to send to the
servers. The query received by Server n is denoted byQ
[k]
n . Let
Q = [Q
[k]
n ]n∈[1:N ],k∈[1:K] denote the complete query scheme,
i.e., the collection of all queries under all choices of the desired
message index. The queries are independent of the messages.
The servers share a common random variable S, the re-
alization of which is unavailable to the user. The common
randomness is independent of the messages and queries, i.e.,
I(S;W[1:K],Q) = 0. Let ρ denote the ratio of the amount of
common randomness relative to the message size, i.e.,
ρ ,
H(S)
H(Wk)
=
H(S)
L
. (1)
The servers follow the protocol agreed with the user a
priori, and generate answers based on the received query Q
[k]
n ,
the stored messagesW[1:K], and the common random variable
S. The answer sent to the user from Server n is denoted by
A
[k]
n . We have H(A
[k]
n |Q
[k]
n ,W[1:K], S) = 0.
Any T servers may collude. To guarantee user-privacy,
from the queries and answers of any T servers, together with
the message contents and the common random variable, the
servers should not be able to infer any information about
the desired message index. Thus, the following user-privacy
constraint must be satisfied,
I(A
[κ]
T , Q
[κ]
T ,W[1:K], S;κ) = 0, ∀T ⊂ [1 : N ], |T | = T. (2)
A Byzantine adversary hidden in the system can observe
and jam the communications. We assume that the adversary
has unlimited computational power, and knows the encoding
and decoding scheme of the user and servers. An omniscient
adversary can observe all the communications in the system;
a limited knowledge adversary only observes part of the
communications. In this work, we assume the adversary has
limited knowledge, and can overwrite the answers of any set
of servers B of size B to A˜
[k]
B . Assume that the adversary holds
some private randomness γ (independent of the messages,
queries, answers and the common randomness) that he can
use for jamming. Two ways of reducing the observation of
the adversary are considered in this work:
Secret channel model: In this model, we assume that there
exists 1 secure low rate (vanishing with message length)
channel between each server and the user. The adversary
can neither observe nor jam the communication on these
channels, but can observe all other communication. Denote
the information that Server n sends to the user through the
secret channel by H
[k]
n , where H(H
[k]
n ) = o(L). H
[k]
[1:N ] is
the only information that the adversary cannot observe. The
corrupted answers are a function of all information available
at the adversary’s side.
H(A˜
[k]
B |γ,A
[k]
[1:N ], Q
[k]
[1:N ]) = 0. (3)
Untouched server model: In this model, there is no secret
channel between the servers and the user. However, the adver-
sary can only observe the communication between E servers
(denoted by E) and the user. The adversary can pick any E
servers to observe, and any B servers to jam (the two sets can
be overlapping or disjoint, but we require E +B < N ),
H(A˜
[k]
B |γ,A
[k]
E , Q
[k]
E ) = 0. (4)
Note that the requirement E + B < N is equivalent to that
there exists at least 1 server that is neither observed nor
jammed (untouched) by the adversary.
Note that the user does not know which answers are
corrupted (A˜
[k]
B ), and we denote all the answers received by
A˜
[k]
[1:N ] = {A˜
[k]
B , A
[k]
[1:N ]\B}. From all the answers (and the
information through secret channels) downloaded and other
information available to the user, the user should be able
to decode the desired message with diminishing probability
of error as L tends to infinity. By Fano’s inequality, this
corresponds to the following correctness constraint,
H(Wk|A˜
[k]
[1:N ],Q, H
[k]
[1:N ]) = o(L) (5)
where for the untouched server model, H
[k]
[1:N ] = ∅.
The user should learn no information about the other
messages besides the desired one, named the database-privacy
constraint. Denote {W1, . . . ,Wk−1,Wk+1, . . . ,WK} by Wk¯,
I(Wk¯; A˜
[k]
[1:N ],Q, H
[k]
[1:N ]) = 0. (6)
The rate, R of a scheme characterizes the number of desired
information symbols retrieved per downloaded symbol3, R =
L
∑
N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
. A rate R is said to be ǫ-error achievable4 if
there exists a sequence of PIR schemes with rate at least R,
and probability of error Pe → 0 as L → ∞. The supremum
of all ǫ-error achievable rates is called the ǫ-error capacity C.
The problem defined in this section is called ǫ-BlTSPIR.
III. MAIN RESULT
Theorem 1: The capacity of the ǫ-BlTSPIR problem is
Cǫ-BlTSPIR =
{
1− T+B
N
, if ρ ≥ T
N−T−B , N > T +B;
0, otherwise.
The achievability proof (the main contribution of this work)
is presented in the next section. The (weak) converse proof is
presented in Section V.
IV. ACHIEVABILITY
A. Example: N = 3, T = 1, B = 1
To illustrate the main idea, consider the setting with 2
messages, each consists of 2 symbols from Fq. Denote W1 =
(a, a′), W2 = (b, b
′), and suppose W1 is desired.
3 We use the uncorrupted answers {A
[k]
n } to define the rate R, because
there is no motivation for the adversary to change the answer sizes (if so, the
user can easily identify the corrupted answers and treat them as erasures).
4In this work, we interpret ǫ as a term that vanishes (a typical assumption
in Shannon theory). Note that this is different from the assumption in strong
converse where ǫ is a fixed positive constant.
The user privately chooses 2 i.i.d. random variables u, v
from Fq. The queries to the 3 servers are generated as follows,
Q
[1]
1 = [u+ 1, v] (7)
Q
[1]
2 = [u+ 2, v] (8)
Q
[1]
3 = [u, v]. (9)
The servers share a common random symbol S from Fq.
Denote W1 = [a; b]. Server n generates a scalar answer by
An = Q
[1]
n ·W1+S. Let X = ua+ vb+S, then the answers
are
A1 = X + a (10)
A2 = X + 2a (11)
A3 = X. (12)
It is evident that from any 2 answers, the user can decode the
symbol a from W1.
The user repeats the scheme for W2 = [a′; b′] (the same
u, v and queries are used, so the upload cost is not increased).
Suppose the servers share another common random symbol S′,
and let X ′ = ua′+vb′+S′. The answers A′1, A
′
2, A
′
3 are then
A′1 = X
′ + a′, A′2 = X
′ + 2a′, A′3 = X
′. The final answers
sent are the collection of An, A
′
n, i.e., A
[1]
n = (An, A
′
n).
1) Secret channel model: The adversary can modify the
answer from 1 server. To identify the corrupted answer, the
servers use a uniform nonzero random variable p ∈ Fq from
the common randomness (secure from the adversary). Server
n calculates a hash (check sum) of its answers,
Hn = pAn + p
2A′n. (13)
Choose an arbitrary server to transmit p, and 2 arbitrary servers
to transmit their Hn to the user through the secret channels.
The user plugs in the received An, A
′
n to check whether (13)
holds.
Because the adversary does not know the values of p and
Hn, the probability that the modified A˜n, A˜
′
n satisfies (13),
i.e., p2 + (A˜′n)
−1A˜np− (A˜′n)
−1Hn = 0 is at most 2/q (for a
proof, refer to Lemma 1), which can be made arbitrarily small
as the alphabet size q increases.
The intuition for generalizing the scheme is that as the
message size and number of repetitions of the scheme increase,
the sizes of p and the hashes {Hn} (transmitted through
the secret channel) vanish when normalized by the message
size. Therefore, with vanishing rate secure channels, the user
decodes 2 desired symbols from 6 downloaded symbols,
achieving the rate of 1/3.
2) Untouched server model: There is no secret channel now
and the adversary can observe any E = 1 server and corrupt
any B = 1 answer. As E+B = 2 = N−1, there is one server
that is neither observed nor jammed by the adversary. Treating
this problem as a point-to-point network coding problem with
N parallel links (where 1 link is untouched), from Theorem 1
in [5], the servers can send some common information to the
user secretly (to the adversary), with vanishing error (bounded
by N/qN ) and constant rate.
Because the secure transmission scheme in [5] can only
send common information that is shared by all servers, we
cannot use it to transmit the hashes ofAn, A
′
n (distinct for each
server). Instead, we will let the servers transmit hashes of the
messages. The challenge here is that by the database-privacy
constraint, the hashes of the messages should not contain any
information about the messages. To fulfill this constraint, the
servers draw independent uniform common random symbols
Sa, Sb from Fq, to be added in the hash generation. The servers
choose a nonzero element p uniformly at random from Fq. The
hashes of W1 and W2 are generated by
Ha = pa+ p
2a′ + p3Sa;Hb = pb+ p
2b′ + p3Sb. (14)
The servers use the secure transmission scheme in [5] to
transmit p,Ha, Hb secretly to the user (not known to the
adversary).
To check the hash Ha on the message symbols (a, a
′), the
user should also obtain the value of Sa (but he should not
learn Sb for database-privacy). To do this, Sa, Sb can be treated
as extended symbols from W1,W2, and Sa can be retrieved
by applying the scheme in (10)-(12). The probability of error
in the hash checking part is bounded by 3/q. Therefore, the
overall probability of error vanishes as q increases. The rate
achieved is 1/3, as desired.
Similarly, to amortize the cost of sending p,Ha, Hb, and
retrieving Sa, we will drive the message length to infinity
(details to be presented in the next section).
B. General parameters
Without loss of generality, suppose each message consists
of L = (N−T−B) · l symbols from Fq, where q = l2 ≫ N ,
and Wk is desired. The idea is to concatenate a scheme for l
instances, and generate hashes of the answers of the l instances
for the secure channel model; or hashes of the messages for
the untouched server model.
Divide each message to l blocks, and collect the i-th
blocks of all messages into a column vector, W(i) =
[W
(i),1
1 ; · · ·;W
(i),N−T−B
1 ; · · ·;W
(i),1
K ; · · ·;W
(i),N−T−B
K ] where
i = [1 : l] denotes the index of the block/instance. Collect
the l column vectors to form the matrix W = [W1 · · ·Wl],
which represents the whole dataset.
The user privately chooses T uniformly i.i.d. row vec-
tors U1, . . . ,UT from F
K(N−T−B)
q . Let e1, . . . , eN−T−B be
row unit vectors, where in ej , all entries are equal to
zero except the ((k − 1)(N − T − B) + j)-th entry. Let
U = [U1; . . . ;UT ]. Similarly, denote e = [e1; . . . ; eN−T−B].
Choose N distinct nonzero elements λ1, . . . , λN from Fq.
Let GU = V
T (λ1, . . . , λN ), i.e., an N × T Vandermonde
matrix, and Ge = diag(λ
T
1 ,. . ., λ
T
N ) ·V
N−T−B(λ1,. . ., λN ),
Then G = [GU Ge] = V
N−B(λ1, . . . , λN ). The queries
to all N servers are generated by
Q
[k]
[1:N ] = GUU+Gee = G ·
[
U
e
]
. (15)
The query Q
[k]
n is sent to Server n. The same query is used
to generate the answers for all l instances.
To protect database-privacy from the user, the servers share
T l uniformly i.i.d. symbols {S
(i)
j }i∈[1:l],j∈[1:T ]. For instance
i, Server n takes the inner product of Q
[k]
n and W
(i), and adds∑T
j=1 λ
j−1
n S
(i)
j to generate the answer. Denote

U1W
1 + S11 · · · U1W
l + Sl1
...
. . .
...
UTW
1 + S1T · · · UTW
l + SlT
W 1,1k · · · W
l,1
k
...
. . .
...
W 1,N−T−Bk · · · W
l,N−T−B
k


△
= X, (16)
then the Nl answers generated by the servers are
[A
[k],1
[1:N ] · · ·A
[k],l
[1:N ]] (17)
= G ·
[
U
e
]
·W +G ·


S11 · · · S
l
1
...
. . .
...
S1T · · · S
l
T
0 · · · 0

 = GX. (18)
The answers from B servers (denoted by the set B) might
be overwritten by the adversary. Denote the noise added by
the adversary by Z
[1:l]
B . The answers received by the user are
[A˜
[k],1
[1:N ] · · · A˜
[k],l
[1:N ]] = GX+BZ
[1:l]
B = [G B] ·
[
X
Z
[1:l]
B
]
, (19)
where B is an N ×B matrix with a distinct 1 in each column
corresponding to the set of answers corrupted by the adversary.
It is easy to check that [G B] is invertible.
The user can exhaust all
(
N
B
)
different B (i.e., different set
of corrupted answers), and obtain a list of
(
N
B
)
solutions of the
linear system (19). For the two models of limited knowledge
adversary, we design different schemes to send hashes to the
user, such that the user can find the correct solution from the(
N
B
)
list with high probability.
1) Secret channel model: Let p1, . . . , pα be α distinct
nonzero elements from Fq chosen uniformly at random by the
servers.5 Let P be an l×α matrix where Pi,j = (pj)
i. Let N
be any set of servers with size N − B, which are chosen to
send the hashes to the user. Denote GN as the square matrix
corresponding to the choice of set N , then it is obvious that
GN is invertible. The hashes are generated by
A
[1:l]
N ·P = GN ·X ·P , H
(N−B)×α. (20)
These servers send p1, . . . , pα and H to the user through
a secure channel (this transmission includes α(N − B + 1)
symbols). Because GN is invertible, the user obtains α hash
functions for each row of X (refer to (16)). In fact, we only
need the hash functions of Wk. Lemma 1 below is inspired
by Claim 5 in [4].
Lemma 1: Let p be uniformly chosen from Fq \ {0},
and {a0, a1, . . . , an} be symbols from Fq such that anpn +
5 Here α is an arbitrary fixed positive integer which determines the number
of hashes for each answer and the speed of vanishing of the error probability.
· · · + a1p + a0 = 0. An adversary can observe and modify
{a1, . . . , an}, but can neither observe nor modify a0. The
probability (over the randomness of p) that the modified
{a˜1, . . . , a˜n} satisfies a˜np
n + · · · + a˜1p + a0 = 0 is at most
n/q.
Proof: Since the adversary cannot observe a0, anp
n+· · ·+a1p
and p remains uniformly at random to the adversary. There-
fore, the adversary can only modify a1, . . . , an arbitrarily. For
any modified {a˜1, . . . , a˜n},
Pr(a˜np
n + · · ·+ a˜1p+ a0 = 0) (21)
= Pr((a˜n − an)p
n + · · ·+ (a˜1 − a1)p = 0) (22)
= Pr(p is a nonzero root of a polynomial with degree ≤ n)
(23)
≤ (n− 1)/(q − 1) ≤ n/q. (24)

By Lemma 1, the probability that an incorrect solution
satisfies all α hashes is at most
(
l
q
)α
. There are
(
N
B
)
solutions
in the list such that by the union bound, the probability that a
unique correct solution cannot be found, i.e., the probability
of error, is at most
(
N
B
) (
l
q
)α
=
(
N
B
) (
1
l
)α
(note that q = l2).
Therefore, the probability of error vanishes with the message
length. Note that the amount of transmission through the secret
channel α(N−B+1) does not grow with the message size L
(the normalized rate approaches 0). Finally, the rate achieved
is R = 1− T+B
N
, and the randomness size is ρ = T
N−T−B .
2) Untouched Server Model: The query and answer gener-
ation includes two phases. The first phase does not depend on
the queries and includes the transmission of random hashes
of all the messages to the user. When the servers send some
shared information to the user, an imaginary source node can
be added and the system can be translated into a network
with min-cut N . Because E +B < N , we can use the secure
transmission scheme of Theorem 1 in [5] to send common
information shared by all servers (simpler schemes might exist
and are an interesting future direction).6
By database-privacy, the hashes of messages should be
protected by some randomness. Therefore, we append α =
(N − T − B)β uniformly random symbols to each message,
denoted by {S
(i),j
Wk
}i∈[1:β],j∈[1:N−T−B], where i denotes the
index of instances (i.e., the user downloads β more instances
to retrieve the {S
(i),j
Wk
} associated with the desired Wk.).
During the first phase, the servers generate and transmit
(N − T − B)β uniform i.i.d. symbols p1, p2, . . . , pα, and α
hashes of each message to the user by the scheme in [5]. Let
P be an (N − T −B)(l+ β)×α matrix where Pi,j = (pj)
i,
and let [Wk, SWk ] denote the row vector comprised of all the
symbols from Wk and {S
(i),j
Wk
}, the hashes are generated by
HWk = [Wk, SWk ] ·P. (25)
6Note that in this model, the servers cannot send the hashes of the answers
as in the secret channel model, because the servers cannot share the queries
and answers due to the user-privacy constraint.
The servers send p1, . . . , pα and {HWk}k∈[1:K] to the user
secretly in a bit-by-bit manner using the scheme in [5]. We
need to send (K + 1)α log q bits in this phase. For each bit,
the servers send N2(N −E) symbols over Fq [5]. Therefore,
the total amount of download for the first phase is N2(N −
E)(K+1)α log q. By Lemma 4 in [5], the probability of error
for this phase is bounded above by N/qN .
The second phase is similar to that in Section IV-B, with
extended message length (N − T − B)(l + β) (because the
user needs also to retrieve {S
(i),j
Wk
} to check the hashes, and
they should be retrieved privately). The second phase involves
a total download of N(l + β) symbols.
Therefore, the total retrieval rate is
R =
(N − T −B)l
N2(N − E)(K + 1)α log q +N(l + β)
→ 1−
T +B
N
,
(26)
as l →∞ (note that log q = 2 log l and log l/l→ 0).
Similarly, the relative amount of shared common random-
ness for the first phase vanishes as l → ∞. For the second
phase, T (l+β) random shared symbols are needed. Therefore,
ρ→ T
N−T−B as l→∞.
An error happens in the second phase when any incorrect
solution satisfies the hashes, which by Lemma 1 occurs with
probability at most
(
N
B
) ( (N−B−T )(l+β)
q
)α
. The error proba-
bility of the first phase is upper bounded by N/qN = N
l2N
[5].
By the union bound, the overall probability of error is at most(
N
B
) ( (N−B−T )(l+β)
l
)α
+ N
l2N
, which tends to 0 as l →∞.
Note that for both the secret channel model and the
untouched server model, user-privacy is guaranteed because
every T servers observe linearly and statistically independent
queries (15). Database-privacy is guaranteed because from X
in (16), the {S
(i)
j } symbols are uniform i.i.d. symbols, such
that the user obtains no information about Wk¯.
V. CONVERSE
Note that the answers corrupted by the adversary A˜
[k]
B may
be useless to the user for decoding Wk. Denote the set of
uncorrupted nodes by H = [1 : N ] \ B, from (5),
H(Wk|A
[k]
H , H
[k]
[1:N ],Q) = o(L). (27)
Further, I(Wk;H
[k]
[1:N ]|A
[k]
H ,Q) ≤ H(H
[k]
[1:N ]) = o(L). Then
H(Wk) = H(Wk)−H(Wk|A
[k]
H , H
[k]
[1:N ],Q) + o(L) (28)
= H(Wk|Q)−H(Wk|A
[k]
H ,Q)
+ I(Wk;H
[k]
[1:N ]|A
[k]
H ,Q) + o(L) (29)
≤ H(Wk|Q)−H(Wk|A
[k]
H ,Q) + o(L) (30)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
H |Wk,Q) + o(L) (31)
≤ H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(AT |Wk,Q) + o(L) (32)
(2)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(AT |Wk′ ,Q) + o(L) (33)
(6)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(AT |Q) + o(L), (34)
for any T ⊂ H with |T | = T . Note that from (32),
the superscript [k] in AT can be dropped because of user-
privacy (2). By Han’s inequality [6],
1(
N−B
T
) ∑
T ⊂H
|T |=T
H(AT |Q) ≥
T
N −B
H(A
[k]
H |Q). (35)
Averaging (34) over all subsets T of H and combining
with (35), we have
H(Wk) ≤
N − B − T
N −B
H(A
[k]
H |Q) + o(L). (36)
By symmetry, we assume the answer sizes are the same.
Therefore,H(Wk) ≤
N−B−T
N−B ·
N−B
N
∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n |Q)+o(L).
By letting L→∞,
R =
H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n )
≤
H(Wk)∑N
n=1H(A
[k]
n |Q)
≤ 1−
B + T
N
. (37)
By database-privacy (6),
0 = I(Wk¯;A
[k]
H ,Q) (38)
= I(Wk¯;A
[k]
H |Q) (39)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
H |Wk¯,Q) (40)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(A
[k]
H |Wk¯,Q)
+H(A
[k]
H |S,Wk,Wk¯,Q) (41)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(S,Wk|Wk¯,Q)
+H(S,Wk|A
[k]
H ,Wk¯,Q) (42)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(S)−H(Wk)
+H(S,Wk|A
[k]
H ,Wk¯,Q) (43)
= H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(S)−H(Wk)
+H(Wk|A
[k]
H ,Wk¯,Q) +H(S|Wk, A
[k]
H ,Wk¯,Q)
(44)
(27)
≥ H(A
[k]
H |Q)−H(S)−H(Wk) + o(L), (45)
where (41) holds because the uncorrupted answers are de-
terministic functions of the queries, the dataset W[1:K], and
the randomness S. (43) holds because the randomness S,
the messages W[1:K], and the queries Q are independent.
Combining (45) with (36), and by letting L→∞,
ρ =
H(S)
H(Wk)
≥
T
N −B − T
. (46)
VI. CONCLUSION
For symmetric PIR with Byzantine adversaries, we show
that if the adversary has limited knowledge and a vanishingly
small probability of error is allowed, the capacity increases
when compared to the setting with omniscient adversaries and
zero probability of error. It is interesting to see if similar results
hold for the PIR problem with Byzantine adversaries [7], [8].7
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